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Abstract
The issue of same-sex marriage legalization is increasingly part of the national
political dialogue. This legalization would have a number of economic impacts, one
of the most direct being a change in income tax payments, through the so-called
marriage penalty. I estimate the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on federal
income tax revenue. These estimates rely critically on the responsiveness of labor
supply and marital choice to changes in the tax code. I present new evidence on
both topics using changes in taxation generated from the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act. In addition, I propose a novel measure of the marriage
penalty that incorporates the fact that agents will respond optimally to changes in
marginal tax rates within the household.
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1 Introduction
The debate over whether same-sex couples should be allowed the legal right to marry
has become a hot-button issue in the United States in the last decade. The Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriage at the federal
level, but a growing number of states and major cities have granted the right to either
marry or enter into other officially-recognized relationships.1 DOMA also allows states
to disregard same-sex marriages granted in other states. While state- and local-level
recognition can have profound social effects, the economic effects of federal recognition of
same-sex marriage are potentially quite important. Changes in this arena are occurring
at the federal level - President Obama recently ordered the Justice Department to cease
defense of DOMA (Savage 2011). In this paper, I explore the effects of same-sex marriage
legalization on federal income tax revenue.
Same-sex marriage legalization has the direct impact of allowing a change in a house-
hold’s legal tax filing status, which can change the household’s income tax burden, via
the “marriage penalty” (which may be positive, a tax, or negative, a subsidy). This
change in the tax schedule causes a change in labor supply, which also affects income tax
revenue. Further, the desire to capture a marriage subsidy or avoid a marriage tax may
cause marriage rates to vary along with the marriage penalty. To fully understand the
effect of same-sex marriage legalization on income tax collection, we must understand the
distribution of marriage penalties across same-sex households, the causal effect of these
penalties on marriage likelihood, and how this change in taxation influences labor supply
choices.
To capture both of these effects, I introduce a new measure of the marriage penalty,
which I call the endogenous marriage penalty.2 Changes in the tax schedule upon mar-
riage will change incentives to work for both partners within a household. This in turn
changes hours worked and further changes the tax rate. I estimate the marriage penalty
1These relationships are often called “civil unions”, but different constituencies offer legal statuses that
provide differing degrees of comparability to the state of marriage. Civil unions are similar to marriage,
offering the same legal rights. Other legal statuses offering fewer and weaker legal rights include domestic
partnerships or reciprocal/designated beneficiaries (Hawkins 2009, Badgett, Gates and Maisel 2008).
2Sjoquist and Walker (1995) have estimated marriage penalties at the aggregate level assuming that
labor market choices differ between married and non-married cohabiting couples (finding little evidence
of aggregate changes), but I’m not aware of any paper that estimates the behavioral response from
microdata.
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as a function of rational responses to anticipated changes in both the worker’s own tax
rate and their partner’s, conditional on whether or not the couple is legally married. This
endogenous marriage penalty is in contrast to the standard measure, which does not allow
for labor market responses to tax changes and as such may be interpreted as an “instan-
taneous” measure. I provide a decomposition to illustrate the sources of the discrepancy
between the instantaneous measure of the marriage penalty and the endogenous measure.
The question of the tax revenue consequences of same-sex marriage is not an idle
one. Both the federal and a number of state governments have explicitly justified their
same-sex marriage bans on the basis of the adverse tax revenue and expenditure effects
(Hawkins 2009). In terms of measuring the tax revenue consequences of legalizing same-
sex marriage, the paper that comes closest to this one is Alm, Badgett, and Whittington
(2000), which is not based on micro-level income data but instead uses estimates of
mean earnings from other papers and imposes varying assumptions about gay and lesbian
household composition to tabulate a range of potential aggregate outcomes. The most
systematic investigation of the net budgetary effects of same-sex marriage legalization
is from the CBO (2004). It estimates an almost $1 billion annual budget windfall to
legalization, $200-$400 million of which come from income tax revenues. The CBO’s
estimates of same-sex marriage penalties draw heavily on Alm, Badgett, and Whittington
(2000).
I show that same-sex marriage legalization would increase federal income tax revenues
somewhere between $100 and $175 million. Given the existing estimates of the increase in
federal costs that would accompany legalization (CBO 2004), the policy at worst would
be revenue-neutral, and, at the upper range of my estimates, may generate $140 million
per year.
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003, an accel-
eration of the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA)
(together frequently called the “Bush tax cuts”) provides a useful natural experiment.3
The Bush tax cuts implemented a number of reforms, but two primary changes were a
general tax cut and a decrease in the average marriage penalty. The JGTRRA in par-
ticular served as an exogenous tax shock. The EGTRRA scheduled a slow phase-in of
3Keifer eta˙l(˙2002) provides a detailed description of the EGTRRA.
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marriage penalty reforms and tax bracket adjustments, but the JGTRRA abruptly im-
plemented all the planned income tax changes starting in tax year 2003. These cuts, the
most substantial tax reforms in the U.S. of the last 15 years, have not been exploited as
a source of variation in the question of household structure, and have only rarely been
used in studies of labor supply choice (Heim 2009, Auten, Carroll, and Gee 2008).
The JGTRRA grants us the ability to make a number of methodological improvements
to the previous literature. While a number of papers (described in section 4.2) have
considered the effect of the marriage penalty on marriage likelihood, none to my knowledge
have used a single, large, unanticipated cut to identify the effect. In combination with
generalized propensity score methods (Hirano and Imbens 2005), I use the JGTRRA
to construct novel estimates of the sensitivity of marriage to taxation. Similarly, while
a small number of papers have studied the labor supply of same-sex couples, few have
based their estimates on plausibly-exogenous shocks to net wages.4
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main sources of data for this study are the U.S. Census 1% sample from the year 2000,
and the American Community Survey from years 2001-2007, as prepared by the IPUMS
project (Ruggles eta˙l2˙010). I restrict the data to the time period 2000 to 2007 to include
4 years of data before and after the implementation of the JGTRRA while excluding the
influence of other tax reforms (in particular the substantial Economic Stimulus Act of
2008). Following the literature on familial labor supply at prime working age, I drop
all households where either member is older than 54, or where the head or partner is
likely to be too young to participate in the labor market (Blau and Kahn 2007).5 I use
a 1% random sample of heterosexual households from the 2000 Census and a 2% sample
from the ACS surveys so that my samples of heterosexual and homosexual couples are of
comparable size in most years.
Since the Census surveys do not ask any questions about sexual behavior or identity,
the only way to identify homosexuals in the data is through cohabitation and reported
4Antecol and Steinberger (2011) is the main exception, using an instrumental variable methodology
very similar to my own, but considering only lesbian women, and only in a single cross-section.
5I definite potential experience as age - 6 - years of education, and drop households where one member
has negative potential experience.
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relationship status. There are well-documented problems with the Census relational data.
Black, Gates, Sanders and Taylor (2007) point out that the sample of same-sex couples
in the 2000 Census is substantially contaminated by mis-allocated individual gender or
relationship status. The Census Bureau treats identification as a spouse or being in the
state of marriage as logically inconsistent with being in a same-sex relationship. It re-codes
either the gender or relationship status of a large number of individuals, creating a large
number of “false positive” homosexual couples within the data. I define a gay or lesbian
couple to be a pair of individuals of the same sex who live in the same household, and where
the respondent classifies the other individual as an “unmarried parter.” Following the
standard response to this problem, I omit from the sample all individuals with allocated
gender or marital status.
Standard theory says that labor supply choices are made in response to marginal
wage rates. I calculate gross wage w by taking annual labor market earnings and dividing
by annual hours worked, as calculated from typical weekly hours worked times weeks
worked in the year. Following the literature, I drop individuals with “extreme” implied
wage rates, below $2 and above $200, as measured in 2004 real dollars (Blau and Kahn
2007). A worker’s marginal wage is w ∗ (1 − µ), where µ represents the federal income
tax rate, including the employee’s share of the payroll (FICA) tax. Since primary earners
overwhelmingly participate in the market, I drop all households where the primary earner
has zero reported hours worked in the year.
Tax data comes from NBER’s TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Couts 1993). These
variables include total federal income tax and FICA contributions. Since my tax data is
generated by TAXSIM, it is not true taxes paid, but predicted taxes based on observable
data within the Census.6 Potentially important variables not found in the Census include
capital gains income and expenditures on child care, health care, mortgage interest and
charitable donations.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of household members within the sample. When
studying household income and specialization, it’s useful to differentiate between primary
and secondary earners (Antecol and Steinberger 2011). Most theoretical and empirical
6These tax-relevant data include the number of children (by age group), labor and business income,
interest and dividend income, social security income, pension income, and payments made for rent or
property tax. These data are all arguments of the tax function defined in section 3.
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approaches treat the male as the primary earner in heterosexual households. I define
the primary earner in homosexual households to be the member whose annual income
is greater. In table 1 I separately describe male and female members of heterosexual
households and primary and secondary earners in homosexual households.
The sample of gay and lesbian households is slightly younger than the married hetero-
sexual couples, but older than the unmarried heterosexual households. Consistent with
Black, Sanders and Taylor (2007), individuals in homosexual households have substan-
tially fewer children and much more education than those in heterosexual households.
Interestingly, in terms of education and wage rates, homosexual households are more
specialized (along the dimension of market versus non-market human capital) than are
heterosexual husbands and wives. Married men and women have identical average lev-
els of education, and among those who work, married women earn about 71% of their
spouse’s wages, while gay secondary earners have 0.7 fewer years of education and median
wages that are 52% of the primary earners’.7 The household wage gap is smaller in lesbian
households than in gay households, but greater than in married households.
3 Marriage and taxes
The first step towards estimating the effects of taxes on household status and labor supply
is to measure the marriage penalty, which involves calculating actual and counterfactual
tax burdens. These calculations allow me to estimate, first, marriage rates as a function
of the tax treatment of marriage, and second, the change in the marginal tax rate due to
marriage.
In principle, it is simple to define actual and counterfactual taxes, and therefore the
marriage penalty. For any pair of individuals (following the notation of Berliant and
Rothstein (2003)), define each individual’s income tax liability when single as T st (ye),
where ye indicates the vector of taxable income streams (and offsetting expenditures and
characteristics) for earner e ∈ {1, 2} and where T st (·) is a function representing the federal
tax schedule for unmarried persons in year t. If two individuals marry, the tax liability is
7Of course, since married women are less likely to work than secondary-earner homosexuals, those mar-
ried women who are in the labor force are a relatively more select group than are homosexual secondary
earners.
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Tmt (y1, y2), where T
m
t (·, ·) is a function representing the federal tax schedule for married
couples in year t. The marriage penalty P is the increase in taxes when a household of
two single individuals instantaneously enter into the state of marriage,
Pt(y1, y2) ≡ Tmt (y1, y2)− (T st (y1) + T st (y2)) . (1)
Clearly, when Pt(y1, y2) < 0, there is a negative marriage penalty, or a marriage sub-
sidy. Since the ye vectors are assumed fixed with respect to marital status, this calculation
rules out the possibility of economies of household scale, for example in terms of rent or
property taxes. Suppose that the first element of ye is labor market income, denoted
yLe . Typically, this value is also fixed in equation 1. If so, the measured penalty is best
interpreted as an instantaneous change in tax burden among the partners, before any
economic responses to the change in martial status can occur.
Given the data in the Census, calculating Tmt (y1, y2) is simple, since the federal tax
schedule pools non-labor income and children within married households. It is less simple
to calculate counterfactual taxes for married couples (i.e., as if they were unmarried).
Many assets in married households are pooled, making a clean distinction between each
member’s non-labor income difficult. Even if the asset holdings of each spouse were clearly
delineated, the assets are unlikely to be split according to these divisions in divorce pro-
ceedings. Taxes if single are calculated, following the literature, as if a “divorce” and a
split of assets occurred, under the assumption that households minimize total tax lability
(Feenberg and Rosen 1994). This method dictates that unmarried couples (whether ac-
tual or counterfactually divorced) will equally split all non-work income between the two
members.
Children are a major tax deduction, and we must determine which parent is assigned
custody of each child when a couple is unmarried. The standard tax-minimization algo-
rithm assigns all child deductions to the higher earner. This implies that the higher earner
will take any non-biological children (i.e., the partner’s child from a different relationship)
into their household after divorce.8 This is an unappealing assumption, especially among
8Another popular method for penalty calculations involves assigning children to the woman, as typ-
ically occurs in divorce settlements. This procedure provides no guidance, however, for homosexual
households. Alm and Whittington (1996) explore the consequences of the opposing methods for allocat-
ing tax deductions. They show that while the different methods imply different marriage penalties, the
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same-sex couples, where there simply cannot be shared biological children. I assign chil-
dren to parents upon divorce in the following way. Parents always claim a child who is
theirs and who is not the biological child of their partner. Shared biological children are
assigned to the higher earner. Individuals with no children file as single while individuals
with children file as head of household.
Figure 1 shows that there is a clear level shift in the average marriage penalty after
2003. The average size of this shift is essentially neutral with respect to martial status
and sexual orientation. Figure 1 aggregates across the child groups described in table 2
and shows that there is no substantial time trend in marriage penalties before or after
the JGTRRA. For every coresidency type, the fall in the average marriage penalty is on
the order of $1000.9
Figure 2 illustrates that all four coresidency types became more likely to draw a
marriage penalty of zero after the JGTRRA (shown in grey) than before (shown in black
outline). For all groups, the modal outcome was to pay a small marriage penalty prior to
the reforms, and to pay nothing afterwards.
Table 2 presents tax liability and marriage penalty statistics, by coresidency, prior
to and after the implementation of the JGTRRA. I also separate the statistics by the
number of children in the household. Homosexual couples are particularly likely to have
no children, and we want to compare them to similar heterosexual couples in this regard.
In terms of changes in actual tax lability, childless gay and lesbian couples experienced
the largest average tax cuts of all groups, an average income tax cut of 8.5% for childless
lesbian women, 6.1% for childless gay men. Similarly, the majority of heterosexual married
couples with children paid a marriage penalty both before and after the reform, while the
majority of homosexual couples (regardless of the presence of children) do not.
Treating the marriage penalty as a lump-sum payment as in equation 1 is useful in
thinking about the economic incentive to marry. But in terms of labor supply choices,
we typically want to know how marginal tax rates will change upon marriage. Here and
throughout the paper, when I calculate individual marginal tax rates when married, I
assume the primary earner is taxed first, starting at the lower marginal rates. Secondary
time trends and year-over-year changes across methods of calculation are virtually identical.
9I use the term ‘coresidency type” to differentiate between individuals living together in heterosexual
married, heterosexual unmarried, gay male and lesbian female households.
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earners (by definition of being secondary) take the primary earner’s income as given and so
are taxed as if their first dollar is the primary earner’s last dollar.10 It always holds, then,
that for marginal labor income tax rates,
∂Tmt
∂yL1
≤ ∂Tmt
∂yL2
. Among the unmarried, typically
∂T st
∂yL1
≥ ∂T st
∂yL2
(since the prime earner typically earns more than the secondary earner, though
this is not true in all heterosexual unmarried households). Holding constant all other
elements of the ye vectors, the more specialized a household is in terms of labor market
earnings, the more the prime earner’s tax rate will fall upon marriage and the more
the secondary earner’s will rise upon marriage (Eissa and Hoynes 2000). The effects of
marriage on incentive to work will therefore differ across coresidency and earner type,
depending on these factors.
As seen in table 3, each worker type experienced a marginal tax rate cut in 2003,
ranging from 1.3 percentage points for secondary-earning gay men to 2.3 percentage points
for unmarried heterosexual women. I define the “rate marriage penalty” to be the increase
in marginal tax rates experienced by an individual when they enter into marriage,
∂Tmt
∂yLe
−
∂T st
∂yLe
. These penalties are calculated assuming no labor market response to any tax schedule
changes that occur upon marriage.
For every coresidency type, the marginal tax rate for primary earners always falls
upon marriage and the rate for secondary earners rises.More interesting are the differences
across coresidency types. Since married couples are relatively specialized in terms of labor
market effort, married women would pay relatively low tax rates if unmarried and high
rates if married. As we’ll see again in section 4.1.1, homosexual secondary earners are more
similar to unmarried women than to married women in terms of labor market outcomes.
Homosexual rate marriage penalties are significantly lower than married women’s, but
are statistically indistinguishable from heterosexual unmarried couples. The Bush tax
reforms lowered the rate penalties for every coresidency type except unmarried couples,
with married women and secondary-earning gay men experiencing the biggest decreases
in rate marriage penalties.
10The labor supply estimation results for married men and women are insensitive to the use of this
rate, rather than applying the pooled top marginal rate to both members of the household.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Labor supply
There is a very large literature studying the effects of taxation on household labor supply
choices. The methodology often takes the form of instrumental variables (IV) estimates
(Mroz (1987) surveys the early literature in this vein).11 Recent contributions to the
literature using instruments similar to my own include Devereaux (2004), Blau and Kahn
(2007), and Antecol and Steinberger (2011), with this last paper focusing in particular
on lesbian households. Orrefice (2011), Leppel (2007) and Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) all
study differences in labor supply choices by sexual orientation, but do not use exogenous
net wage variation as a source of identification.
In this section, I estimate the labor supply function (in the form of an hours equation)
by coresidency type and primary/secondary worker status in section 4.1.1.12 Using those
estimates, in section 4.1.2 I introduce an alternative measure of the marriage penalty, the
“endogenous” penalty, which allows individuals to make optimal labor market responses
in response to the shift in tax schedule that occurs upon marriage or divorce.
4.1.1 IV estimates of own- and partner-wage effects
Suppose that the worker’s labor supply function is given by the equation
hicet = α
1
ce lnw
o
icet + α
2
ce lnw
p
icet + α
3
ceIict + βceXicet + εicet , (2)
where i indexes households across coresidency types c, earner types (primary or secondary)
e , and time periods t. Letting w measure the net-of-taxes marginal wage, annual hours
worked h is a function of (the log of) both the individual’s own wage, wo, and their
partner’s, wp. Iict measures the household’s non-labor market income, and Xicet is a vector
of individual and household characteristics.13 I do not include indicators for educational
attainment (education is one of my grouping instruments), and so the α1ce coefficient is
11Simple difference-in-difference estimates are also widely used in the literature, as in Eissa (1995),
LaLumia (2009), and Crossley and Jeon (2007).
12I use the term ‘coresidency type” to differentiate between individuals living together in heterosexual
married, heterosexual unmarried, gay male and lesbian female households.
13In every specification reported, these covariates include indicators for race, Hispanic ethnicity, and
time and geographical region indicator variables.
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not interpretable as the compensated labor supply elasticity, but instead as the effect of a
lifetime wage increase (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). All coefficients are allowed to differ
across the eight individual types ce.
I do not estimate the labor market participation choice. This is primarily for compa-
rability with the previous literature. For the purposes of estimating tax revenue changes
in section 5, this is equivalent to assuming that for the relevant range of policy options, no
individual will opt into or out of the labor market due to changes in household taxation
stemming from marital choices.
Standard economic theory makes clear that hours worked and wages are endogenously
determined, as high-productivity workers will typically work more hours and draw higher
wages, biasing OLS regression results. I use two sources of exogenous variation in net-
of-taxation marginal wages. First, I estimate equation 2 using data only from 2003 and
2004, exploiting the expected break in tax rates, all else equal, caused by the JGTRRA.14
Second, I use only changes in wages associated with exogenous characteristics. In par-
ticular, I use group-membership indicators as instruments for wages (Angrist 1991). The
identifying assumption is that the demographic groups are defined such that they are
unrelated and unchangeable with respect to the policy change, but the policy change has
different effects on the different groups (Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (BDM) 1998). The
intuition of the instruments can be seen in table 2, where the change in tax burden after
the JGTRRA varies substantially across coresidency type and the number of children
present.
Because of the progressivity of the tax schedule, the tax cuts will have a different
effect on households of different income levels. I take each partners’ birth year and level
of terminal education to be shifters of earnings. Both are clearly exogenous with respect
to current economic conditions. BDM (1998) suggest (but do not use) the presence of
children as a grouping instrument, and the tax code explicitly changed with respect to the
treatment of children. While it is unlikely that there was sufficient time to adjust family
size in response to the tax cuts between 2003 and 2004, I take the precaution of grouping
households by the presence of children aged 2-15 as another demographically exogenous
characteristic. It is not possible to bear a child and rear it to two years of age in the
14In addition, a short time horizon reduces any potential impact of a violation of the “parallel-lines”
assumption implicit in the class of instrumental variables estimators that I apply (BDM 1998).
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two sample years in response to the policy shock, and since parents are generally legally
responsible to rear a child until age 18, it is very difficult to remove a child under age 15
or 16 from the household in response to economic conditions.15 I create three categories
for each of these variables. Allowing group means to differ across time generates 54 (=
3 x 3 x 3 x 2) groups per ce type. Devereaux (2004) points out that in the presence of
assortative mating, not only will own-wage be endogenous, but so will partner wage. Both
he and Antecol and Steinberger (2011) instrument for both own- and parter-wages. I also
will treat partner wages as endogenous, and include a set of 54 indicators for partner type
in the vector of instruments, in addition to the own-type indicators.
Since individuals have reservation wages (due to the value of leisure, fixed costs of
working, etc), those who draw low wage offers will opt out of the labor force. Low-skill
workers will be particularly likely to draw very low offers, causing low-offer individuals
and their parters to be omitted from the estimates of equation 2. This tends to bias
α1ce downward for secondary workers.
16 Two commonly-applied corrections for this issue
are wage imputation (Blau and Kahn 2007) and re-weighting schemes (Juhn 1992, Juhn
and Murphy 1997). Both function to represent the entire wage offer distribution when
we estimate equation 2. The implementation of these corrections is described in detail
in appendix A.1. Since all prime earners work in my sample, these corrections are only
made with respect to households whose secondary earners do not report a wage.
Table 4 presents estimates of the equation 2 labor supply model. Panel A gives the
basic grouped-mean IV estimates while panels C and C add in the re-weighting and wage
imputation censoring corrections, respectively.
By and large, primary earners are fairly similar across coresidency type. Own-wage
coefficients tend to be small or statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional
levels. The insignificant heterosexual male coefficients suggest an uncompensated own-
wage elasticity between 0.02 and 0.05. For gay men, the (also statistically insignificant)
elasticity estimates range from 0.005 to -0.08. Children have little influence on labor
supply decisions of prime earners. We can never reject the hypothesis that the sensitivity
of hours worked to wages (either their own, or their partner’s) between married men and
15This discussion clearly omits the small impact of adoption or child mortality.
16The bias in α2ce for secondary workers and in both log wage coefficients for primary workers is
theoretically ambiguous, depending on the effects of productive substitution and complementarity, and
assortative mating.
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prime-earning homosexuals is equal. Correcting for selection of partners into the labor
force reduces our estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to own-wages and partner-
wages among unmarried households, heterosexual and homosexual alike.
The same broad-brush similarly does not hold among secondary earners. There are
essentially two types of secondary earners: married women, and everyone else. Consis-
tent with the literature (Mroz 1987, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999), in every specification,
married women have upward-sloping supply curves. Panel C implies an uncompensated
own-wage elasticity among working married women of 0.48. Secondary-earner homosex-
uals and unmarried heterosexual women all behave similarly in terms of labor supply.
Own- and partner-wage coefficients among these groups are the opposite sign as married
women’s. Statistically, we always reject equivalence of wage effects between secondary-
earning homosexuals and married women, and we can not reject equivalence to unmarried
women’s wage coefficients, except for among lesbian women in panel C. Across all three
panels, homosexual secondary earners’ hours are very sensitive to partner wages. The
uncompensated partner-wage elasticities range from 0.38 among lesbian women in panel
B, to 0.45 among lesbian in panel C. In contrast to prime earners, controlling for labor
market selectivity increases our estimates of the sensitivity of labor supply to own-wages
and partner-wages for secondary earners in all household types.
It is consistent with past literature to find negative labor supply elasticities among
non-married secondary earners. Antecol and Steinberger (2011) find negative own-wage
elasticities among lesbian women in the 2000 Census. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) ar-
gue that childless couples are much more likely to form couples on the basis of assortative
mating (rather than labor market specialization). Non-married secondary earners are
more likely to work than married women (see table 1), and the positive partner-wage
coefficients are consistent with assortative mating behavior. Black, Sanders and Taylor
(2007) argue that since homosexual couples have fewer children, they tend to gravitate to
higher-private-amenity, higher-cost areas. The rewards to living in a dual-earner house-
holds are presumably greater in these areas, and this could drive greater household sorting
by ability and greater coordination of labor supply decisions.
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4.1.2 Endogenous marriage penalty
Given estimates of hours worked as a function of net-of-taxes wages, we can return to
the measurement of the marriage penalty. The standard marriage penalty calculation is
instantaneous in the sense of assuming no behavioral response to the shift in tax schedule
that occurs upon marriage. Table 3 shows that there are substantial changes in marginal
tax rates upon marriage, and so this assumption is rather unappealing. Instead, table 4
tells us that workers will adjust hours in response to changes in the tax schedule. These
hours adjustments will change the tax burden, and so will affect the marriage penalty. I
describe here an alternate way of calculating the marriage penalty, allowing for endogenous
hours response to marriage and divorce, and I calculate the average bias implicit in the
standard instantaneous measure.
I use the coefficients from my estimates of equation 2 to predict labor supply given
the change in tax schedule.17 Letting µ be the marginal tax rate, a worker’s expected
labor income is woicetĥicet = w
o
icet(α̂
1(woicet(1−µoicet))+ α̂2(wpicet(1−µpicet))+ β̂ceXicet), where
non-labor income is included in the Xicet here.
18
A worker’s hours choice will change as a function of changes in both her own marginal
tax rate and her partner’s. The marginal tax rate µoicet is in turn a function of the
hours choice. I predict each worker’s hours choice given married and single tax schedules,
household wages, the Xicet variables, and the value of income tax deductions. Predicted
hours imply a marginal tax rate, which in turn give am hours choice. I iterate over this
process until marginal tax rates for both household members converge. This generates
predicted tax labilities when single and when married.
Denote the predictions of hours under each tax system for each earner to be ĥeq, where
q ∈ (m, s) indicates marital status (and −q implies the counterfactual marital status).
This hours choice implies a gross income ŷeq and average tax rate τ̂
e
q . I show in appendix
A.3 that we can state the bias (overstatement) of the instantaneous method relative to
17I use the Blau and Kahn adjustment to estimate potential wages throughout the paper. All the data
used in this section if from the years 2004-2007, under the post-JGTRRA tax system.
18One way to justify the use of an instantaneous marriage penalty is to assume that hours are a function
of gross wages rather than net-of-taxes wages. Since wages are typically assumed to be exogenous to
marital status, hicet does not change upon marriage if taxes are excluded from the hours equation.
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the endogenous method to be
I − E =
∑
e=1,2
we
[
heq
(
(τ em − τ es )− (τ̂ em − τ̂ es )
)
+ (heq − ĥeq)(τ̂ em − τ̂ es )
+ τ e−q
(
(hem − hes)− (ĥem − ĥes)
)
+ (τ e−q − τ̂ e−q)(ĥem − ĥes)
]
+ nem(τ
e
m − τ̂ em)− nes(τ es − τ̂ es )
(3)
where variables without hats represent the observed values in the data, as used in the
instantaneous method of calculation.
There are five types of bias described in equation 3. The first term, weheq ((τ
e
m − τ es )
- (τ̂ em − τ̂ es )
)
, describes the tax rate bias of the instantaneous method: the tax revenue
impact of the fact that, because it does not allow workers to adjust labor market choices,
the change in the tax rate upon marriage is overstated (evaluated at the observed level
of hours worked). The second term, we(heq − ĥeq)(τ̂ em − τ̂ es ), describes the modeling bias :
the difference in collected tax revenue due to the difference in predicted labor market
earnings in the observed marital state. Note that this does not primarily come from
prediction error in the hours equation, which in expectation is mean-zero. Instead, it
comes from the induced correlation between hours and wages that arises when we predict
hours according to equation 2. The third term, weτ e−q
(
(hem − hes)− (ĥem − ĥes)
)
, describes
the instantaneous hours bias : the value of the expected hours response to the changes
in taxation upon marriage (since I hold deductions and non-work income constant). The
fourth term, we(τ e−q− τ̂ e−q)(ĥem−ĥes) is the counterfactual bias, the value of the difference in
tax rates calculated for the non-observed marital status. Finally, nem(τ
e
m−τ̂ em)−nes(τ es−τ̂ es ),
the non-work income bias represents the difference in tax treatment of non-work income
between the two methods. Table 5 decomposes the average difference in the two marriage
penalty measures, by coresidency type, into these 5 sources of bias.
For every household type, allowing for an endogenous labor market response to changes
in the tax schedule results in higher predicted marriage penalties, on the order of $900
per household. The role of the non-work income and counterfactual biases are very small.
For secondary earners, the modeling bias is quite large. Since wages and hours are, by
construction, much more highly correlated when we model hours as a function of wages,
we tend to over-predict hours for high-wage workers and under-predict hours for low-wage
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workers (illustrating one aspect of why the labor supply behavior of secondary earners is
of such perennial research interest (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999)). This modeling bias is
particularly large for heterosexual married couples and gay men, the two highest-earning
household types.
The two biases of primary theoretical interest are the tax rate bias and the hours
bias. The instantaneous method assumes no hours response to changes in taxation due to
entrance or exit into marriage. In terms of tax revenue, for the average heterosexual couple
this assumption is not unreasonable. The endogenous method predicts only small average
changes in hours worked after changing marital status. The endogenous method predicts
a $55 smaller marriage penalty as a result. Secondary earners in homosexual households
are predicted to work substantially more when married (ĥem− ĥes) > (hem−hes), generating
$167 and $283 more in tax revenue from gay and lesbian households, respectively, than
predicted by the instantaneous method. This is the largest component of (non-modeling)
instantaneous bias for homosexual households. For heterosexual households, the tax rate
bias is the largest (non-modeling) contributor to the instantaneous bias. Allowing for
endogenous labor market responses, the tax rate when single will be lower, and the tax
rate when married higher (since (τ̂ em − τ̂ es ) > (τ em − τ es )) than the instantaneous method
asserts, contributing $360 to the instantaneous under-prediction of marriage penalties.
Clearly, accounting for the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in the tax struc-
ture could have a large impact on our estimates of the tax revenue changes generated by
same-sex marriage legalization.
4.2 Marriage choice
Very few studies have measured the consequences of the Bush tax cuts on the labor market.
None, to my knowledge, have focused on its consequences in terms of the marriage market.
In terms of labor market effects, Heim (2009) simulates the consequences of the JGTRRA
based on estimates from the 2001 PSID. Auten, Carroll, and Gee (2008) estimate the
sensitivity of taxable income to the tax change, but not the sensitivity of labor supply per
se. A much larger literature exists with respect to the effects on consumption and savings
with respect to the 2001 tax rebate (see for example Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006)
and its references). In addition to using plausibly exogenous and unexpected changes in
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policy, my estimates are the first that I’m aware of to account for the fact that assignments
to treatment groups (i.e., the size of the marriage penalty) is non-random with respect to
observable characteristics.
Alm and Whittington (2003) undertake the most thorough longitudinal study of the
effects of taxation on marriage (among heterosexuals). They show that while transitions
from non-cohabitation to cohabitation (either married or not) are insensitive to taxa-
tion, the transition from unmarried cohabitation to marriage is significantly influenced by
changes in the household’s instantaneous marriage penalty. Badgett, Gates, and Maisel
(2008) analyze the sensitivity of cohabitation status to economic factors among homosex-
ual couples, and find little influence.
The marriage penalty is not distributed randomly with respect to marital status, and
so simple OLS will provide a biased estimate of the effect of taxes on marriage.19 Since
marital choice is partly a function of the expected marriage penalty, we must estimate
martial choice as a function of unexpected changes in the marriage penalty. Alm and
Whittington (2003) used variation used from changes in tax law between 1983-1997 to
reach their conclusions. They show in previous work (Alm and Whittington 1996), how-
ever, that no discrete changes in the marriage penalty occurred over that time period.
The JGTRRA created the first major jump in the marriage penalty since 1977 (see figure
1 and Alm and Whittington (1996)), and was largely unexpected.
I apply the Hirano-Imbens (2005) estimator of the effects of a continuous treatment
variable. The treatment is the “jump” between the expected marriage penalty as a func-
tion of the pre-JGTRRA tax schedule p̂(y1, y2) and the actually-experienced marriage
penalty after implementation of the JGTRRA, P (y1, y2). In essence, the expectation
p̂(y1, y2) can be treated as a taxation propensity score, a function of observable character-
istics. I identify responsiveness of marital choice to taxation by comparing households with
identical p̂(y1, y2) that are exposed to varying levels of the treatment, P (y1, y2). To ensure
the necessary condition of sample overlap is satisfied (Imbens 2004), I balance the data
following Barsky, Bound, Charles, and Lupman (BBCL 2002). The weights constructed
by the BBCL procedure impose the counterfactual assumption that the distribution of
19For example, in the standard Becker (1991) model of household formation, partners will choose to
specialize in market or non-market production. All else equal, individuals who plan to marry will also a)
tend to be more specialized, and b) will have higher-earning primary workers. Each of these facts affects
the marriage penalty.
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P (y1, y2) among married household matches the distribution observed among unmarried
households. Intuitively, this process places greater weight on the married households that
are observably most similar to non-married households in terms of the treatment received.
Appendix A.2 describes the precise econometric procedure used to derive the estimates
of this section.
Figure 3 plots the likelihood of marriage as a function of the marriage penalty (the
outcome of equation A.5, ̂E(Im(P (y1, y2)))), for three types of heterosexual households:
those with no children, those with one child, and those with more than one child. The
plots are estimated via local polynomial regression. Under the assumptions of (weak) un-
confoundedness and overlap (as summarized in Imbens (2004)) these functions describe
the causal effect of marriage penalties on marital choice. The black curves are estimates
based on the instantaneous penalty, while grey curves are estimates based on the endoge-
nous penalty (with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in dashed grey lines).
There are three main conclusions from figure 3. First, the marriage penalty conveys
a clear negative treatment effect among childless couples. Imposing the assumption of
strict linearity in the treatment effect, the coefficient from regressing predicted marriage
outcomes (as predicted via the results reported in table A.2) on the instantaneous marriage
penalty is -0.000031 (s.e. = 0.00001). Evaluated at a typical marriage penalty cut of
around -$800, this implies an increase in the probability of marriage of three-fifths of a
percentage point for a childless couple (from 85.0% to 85.6%). This is a small effect, to be
sure, but statistically significant and in line with the previous literature. This estimate is
almost identical to that of Alm and Whittington (2003).
Second, the results are relatively insensitive to whether we use changes in the instanta-
neous or endogenous measure of the marriage penalty. Among childless couples, the linear
treatment effect of the endogenous marriage penalty on marriage likelihood is -0.000045
(s.e. = 0.00001). This at once confirms that past studies of the relationship between tax-
ation and marriage are robust to this new measure of the marriage penalty, while allowing
us to apply more economically realistic measures of the tax revenue response to changes
in marital status.
Third, among households with children, there is little evidence that unexpected changes
in the marriage penalty cause changes in marriage likelihood. Both marriage penalty mea-
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sures suggest an insignificant negative relationship between marriage and penalties among
multi-child households. The instantaneous penalty implies a significantly positive rela-
tionship among single-child households (coefficient = 0.000033, s.e. = 0.00001), but the
endogenous penalty implies a much smaller, negative, statistically insignificant effect. As
the plot illustrates, the positive linear relationship of the instantaneous method comes
almost entirely from the very imprecise estimates among low-penalty households.20 The
conservative conclusion is to reject the hypothesis of a consistent treatment effect, positive
or negative, in this group.
5 Consequences of Same-Sex Marriage Legalization
A primary difficulty in estimating the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on fed-
eral income tax collection is knowing the marriage rate applicable to homosexual couples.
Previous studies have applied a number of rates. The Williams Institute at UCLA as-
sumes a 50% same-sex marriage rate (Badgett and Sears 2005, Badgett 2010).21 Badgett
(2010) also cites a number of studies that suggest that 80% of young gay individuals
hope to marry. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2004) assumes that to a first
approximation, all cohabiting same-sex couples would marry.
There are alternatives to these assumptions. We might assume that marriage likeli-
hood is a function of demographic characteristics and is unrelated to sexual orientation.
I impose this assumption by estimating the likelihood of marriage (among heterosexuals)
via probit regression, as a function of age, terminal education, number of children in the
household, and state of residence. Or, we could assume that marriage likelihood among
same-sex couples is responsive to the marriage penalty in exactly the same way as it is
among heterosexuals: the dose-response functions of figure 3 apply to same-sex couples.
Finally (for the purposes of this paper) we could assume, as does the Williams Institute,
20Among one-child households, the lower the woman’s earnings, the less likely she is to be married.
The opposite is true among the childless and multiple child families. Since marriage penalties fall as
the secondary earner’s income fall (i.e., the tax code rewards specialization and penalizes dual-earners),
there is a relatively large pool of high-subsidy unmarried one-child couples, which generates the inverted-U
shape of the dose-response function using the instantaneous method. Notice the large confidence intervals
around the average marriage likelihood in this group. This relates to the growth of out-of-wedlock births
in poor urban areas (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).
21The Williams Institute has released a series of state-level evaluations of the fis-
cal impact of state-level same-sex marriage legalization, which may be found at
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute//publications/Policy-Econ-index.html.
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that the typical same-sex household has a 50% likelihood of marrying, but that marriage
likelihood decreases in the marriage penalty, exactly as in figure 3. I take the figure 3
marital response functions and decrease them until they have a mean likelihood of 0.5.
Let pi be the probability of marriage, and T
q
i be the tax lability of household i given
marital status q. Given that all same-sex couples are single prior to legalization, the
expected change in federal tax liability after legalization is pi(T
m
i − T si ), or p times the
marriage penalty. I aggregate to the national level by multiplying this number times its
household sampling weight and summing by year. My estimates are conservative for two
reasons. The first is because of the under-count of same-sex couples in the Census due
to the omission of individuals with allocated gender and marital status. Second, because
we can only observe existing coresident homosexual couples in the Census and ACS, I
can not account for the degree to which gay and lesbian will form households based on
legalization of same-sex marriage.
Table 6 presents annual averages for the indicated time frames (2000-2002 and 2005-
2007) for three measures of the marriage penalty: the instantaneous penalty, the endoge-
nous penalty, and a“de-biased” penalty that removes the contribution of the modeling
and counterfactual biases from the discrepancy between the instantaneous and endoge-
nous methods, so that only the changes due to endogenous hours, tax rate, and nonwork
income adjustments remain.
I present the income tax revenue estimates from 2000-2002 mainly to compare my
estimates to previous work. The CBO (2004) estimated a pre-JGTRRA revenue boost
between $200-$400 million, using a 100% marriage rate and an instantaneous penalty
measure. My estimate in this case is a $231 million revenue boost, within their range, but
at the low end. Alm, Badgett, and Whittington (2000), who do not use individual-level
tax data, estimate revenue boosts in the range of $260 million to $1.3 billion, with their
preferred estimate being $1 billion in additional income tax revenue. My instantaneous
estimates are all below this range.
Between 2000 and 2002, the endogenous method of measuring the marriage penalty
implies revenue boosts that are consistently more than double those of the instantaneous
method. At the high end of the estimates, when we use the unadjusted endogenous
penalty and assume a 100% marriage rate among observed same-sex couples, the federal
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revenue gain is $491 million. At the low end, the bias-corrected endogenous penalty,
assuming a 50% mean marriage rate and the empirical marginal response of marriage
likelihood to the marriage penalty, the revenue gain to marriage legalization would have
been $176 million. Notice that applying this “mean-50 conditional marriage expectation”
almost always results in lower revenue estimates than the simple p = 0.5 estimates, since
high-penalty households are the least likely to marry, all else equal.
My preferred results are the estimates based on the endogenous marriage penalty,
and using the heterosexual conditional marriage expectation. This measure allows for
optimizing agents to respond to the tax system in terms of both marriage and labor
supply choice. The mean marriage probability among childless couples (the child-rearing
category into which most same-sex couples fall) is around 85%. While this is much higher
than the Williams Institute’s preferred value, it is below that used by the CBO, and is in
line with survey data on expressed willingness-to-marry among same-sex couples (Badgett
2010). The de-biased endogenous penalty corrects for some of the problems inherent in
predicting hours choices (in particular, the induced wage-hour correlation), and in terms
of revenue is always a more conservative estimate of revenue gains, so I tend to prefer
those results in this context. Allowing for endogenous economic response, my preferred
estimate implies an income tax revenue boost of $131 million (and no larger than $252
million, for any plausible set of assumptions). In the time period between the JGTRRA
and the economic crisis of 2008, I estimate that the instantaneous method under-states the
revenue gains from legalization, relative to the de-biased endogenous penalty, by $60-$120
million annually.
In the context of the federal budget, where income tax revenues were on the order of
$1 trillion, these revenue gains are obviously very small. To put the same-sex numbers
into context, in 2007, married heterosexual couples contributed the equivalent of $5.4
billion in (instantaneous) marriage penalty revenue to the federal government, or about
$160 per married household. The expected gain in per-household revenue upon same-sex
marriage legalization based on the instantaneous penalty and the heterosexual conditional
marriage expectation is $118.
These estimates do not incorporate the changes in federal government expenditure
that would arise from same-sex marriage legalization. These payments are projected to
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be small, on the order of $100 million in total annually, split mainly between medicare
and social security payments to spouses (CBO 2009) and health care and other partner
benefits (CBO 2010). Interestingly, these cost increases almost exactly offset my preferred
estimate of the revenue gains, suggesting that the federal legalization of same-sex marriage
may be revenue-neutral.
6 Conclusion
Same-sex marriage legalization is a topic that inspires passionate responses from partisans
on all sides. While the politics of the debate are likely to remain hot, it’s necessary to
have cool economic analysis at hand to understand the costs and benefits of the proposal.
While many people have argued about the financial aspects of the law, I argue that
credible economic and statistical identification is hard to find in the literature. I exploit a
major exogenous break in the tax code to estimate the labor market response to changes
in the tax rate that would accompany same-sex marriage, were it legalized. Using the
same tax code shock, I present new evidence on the sensitivity of marriage to taxes among
cohabiting couples.
I show that primary and secondary earners in homosexual households make very dif-
ferent labor market choices as a function of net wages. Further, the supply functions
of homosexual couples are very different from heterosexual married couples. As such, it
is reasonable to assume that homosexual and heterosexual couples’ tax burdens might
differ after marriage, all else equal. I present a new measure of the marriage penalty, the
endogenous penalty, that measures the change in tax burden upon marriage as a function
of the optimal labor market choices of both parters across households of different types.
I argue that the most reasonable estimates of the changes in tax revenue upon legaliza-
tion are in the $100-$175 million range. Including reasonable measures of the additional
costs that would come with same-sex marriage legalization, this implies the policy is at
least, on net, revenue-neutral, and may generate a small boost to federal governmental
coffers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Labor Supply Estimation
A.1.1 Grouping instruments
I separate families with children aged 2-15 into three groups, those with 0 children, 1
child, or 2 or more children. I use three cohorts, defined by those born 1959 and earlier,
those born 1960-1969, and those born 1970 or after. The educational groups are those
with a high school diploma or less, those with more than high school but less than a
bachelors degree (including college dropouts and those with associates degrees or simi-
lar credentials), and those with bachelor’s and/or post-baccalaureate degrees. In every
specification, I allow group effects to differ before and after the Bush tax (over two time
periods t). Interacting the categories, I have 3 x 3 x 3 x 2 = 54 groups. I estimate
equation 2 separately by coresidency group and earner type. Denote the vector of these
group indicators gce. Due to the potential presence of assortative mating, in every labor
supply regression, I instrument wages using both own- and partner-group indicators.
A.1.2 Selection: re-weighting
I follow the framework of Juhn and Murphy (1997) to implement the re-weighting cor-
rection for censoring at the bottom of the wage offer distribution. The idea is that those
with low wage offers are likely to have low skill, and therefore would have both low wage
offers and low hours worked, if they participated in the market. The people with reported
wage data who are most similar to those without reported wages are those from the same
group gce with low hours. I define “low hours” as 1 to 20 hours on the job in the typical
week.
I define the number of individuals of each gce group who did not work as N
0
g and the
number who worked 1 to 20 hours as N1g . Let the weight adjustment ag = (1 +
N0g
N1g
).
This adjustment factor ag allows households where the secondary earner works low hours
(has low skill) to represent both working (non-censored) and non-working (censored)
observations. Where ωicet represents the sampling weights and u
s
ict is the usual weekly
hours of work of the secondary earner in each observed household, define the adjusted
weights by
λicet =

0 if usict = 0
ag ∗ ωicet if 1 ≤ usict ≤ 20
ωicet if u
s
ict > 20
(A.1)
This adjustment is applied to both the primary and secondary earner to account for
assortative mating or any other relationship between censored observations and observable
household characteristics.
Juhn and Murphy (1997) argue that this method has the advantage of incorporating
the distribution of all observable characteristics into the estimates, as opposed to only
using information on mean wages, as done in the wage imputation method described
below.
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A.1.3 Selection: wage imputation
This procedure follows the discussion in Blau and Kahn (2007), and is widely applied in
the literature. Again start with the set of grouping instruments gce.
Again assume that those who do not work are “low skilled” and most comparable to
workers (of their gce type) who work low hours (1 ≤ usict ≤ 20). Among secondary workers,
I estimate the conditional mean of net-of-tax log wages using the equation
lnwicet = ψgctgcet + γZicet + υicet (A.2)
where ψgct is the vector of coefficients associated with group indicators, Zicet is a vector of
variables (whose effects are common across gce types) that shift wages. I include race and
geographic region indicators in Zicet, and I allow for the existence of coresidency-group-
specific time trends in wages.
I use the parameter estimates from equation A.2 to impute lnwicet to secondary earners
without wage data due to zero reported work hours. These conditional mean wageŝlnwicet
are then included (and the households no longer dropped) when I run the labor supply
regression, equation 2. These wages are used both as ln(woicet) in the secondary-earner
regressions and as ln(wpicet) in primary earner regressions.
A.2 Marriage Choice Estimation
To estimate marriage choice as a function of the marriage penalty, I apply three corrections
to ensure the exogeneity of the marriage penalty with respect to marital status. Following
the Hirano and Imbens (2005) model for continuous treatment variables, I estimate the
conditional marriage function
E(Im(pi)| p) = α0 + α1pi + α2pi2 + α3p(y1, y2) + α4p(y1, y2)2 + α5pi · p(y1, y2) (A.3)
where Im is an indicator variable taking the value of one when the individual is married, pi
represents the treatment variable, the marriage penalty, and p = p(y1, y2) is the expected
marriage penalty as a function of taxable assets and offsets of each household member,
as in equation 1. p(y1, y2) is also referred to as the generalized propensity score. My first
source of exogeneity is to only use changes in the marriage penalty around the expected
level to identify the effects of marriage penalty on marriage.
Since “true” marriage penalty pi is actually a deterministic function of y1 and y2, it
might appear that any differences between pi and the our estimate of this generalized
propensity score p̂(y1, y2) must come via functional-form misspecifications of p(y1, y2).
This would be true if the tax schedule were fixed across time, but my second source of
exogeneity is the JGTRRA tax reforms of 2003. I estimate the coefficients of the propen-
sity score function based on data from 2002 and 2003 (the time between the EGTRRA
and JGTRRA reforms) and then predict p̂(y1, y2) based on y1 and y2 data observed in
2003 and 2004 (immediately before and after the JGTRRA). Thus, the primary source of
variation in pi conditional on p̂(y1, y2) in equation A.3 is the unexpected shock to the tax
schedule in tax year 2003. I estimate the propensity score via OLS using quadratic terms
in the income of the higher-earner and the earnings gap between household members (see
Eissa and Hoynes 2000), linear terms in non-work income and expenditure variables, and
indicator variables for every possible number of children. The propensity score regression
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results are given in table A.1. Adding higher-order polynomial terms in any variable does
not affect explanatory power, R2. The results clearly do not capture all the non-linearities
of the tax schedule (else, the R2 would equal 1), but it does explain the great bulk of the
determinants of the marriage penalty.
While equation A.3 describes the response of marriage to unexpected changes in the
marriage penalty, it does not imply anything about how common each level of treatment
is among those who are married and those who are unmarried. In particular, since the
Census is purely cross-sectional, individuals who are married tend to be much older,
higher-income, and more specialized in the labor market. Each of these factors implies that
the married are over-represented among low-penalty households and under-represented
among high-penalty households. In order to “balance” the sample in order to create of
sample overlap (a necessary condition for identification) and to place appropriate weight
on those married households most observably similar to unmarried households, my third
correction is to re-weight the data following the method of BBCL (2002).
Intuitively, we ask: given pi, what is the relative likelihood that the individual is
unmarried, as a proportion of the population representation? In practice, I partition the
unmarried in the 2003 Census into 20 marriage penalty quantile bins defined by pib. Since
the tax schedule changed in 2003, people with the same observable characteristics will
have different treatment levels pi in 2003 and 2004. Holding the tax schedule constant
(which involves generating counterfactual taxes via TAXSIM under the assumption that
there was no JGTRRA) I take every heterosexual in 2004 and every married household in
2003 and place them into the appropriate 2003 unmarried penalty bin pib. Then for each
bin I construct the weight adjustment factor
φ(pi) =
Pr(Im = 0| pi)/Pr(Im = 0)
Pr(Im = 1| pi)/Pr(Im = 1) if pib−1 < pi ≤ pib. (A.4)
Given sample weights ωicet, the weights applied in the estimation of equation A.3 are
ωicet × φ(piict). This process balances the sample with respect to the determinants of
pi, and the tax schedule changes after 2003. BBCL stress that this weight imposes the
assumption that the distribution of the treatment (the marriage penalty) among the
married matches the distribution among the unmarried. I set φ(pi)=0 for households whose
marriage penalty is either greater than the maximum observed among the unmarried in
2003, or is lower than the minimum, to enforce a common support of the treatment
variable.
The entire process described above allows me to recover the average potential out-
come (or “dose-response” function) by predicting the expected marriage outcome over
the treatment levels of interest. This dose-response function is given by
̂E(Im(pi)) =E
[
α̂0 + α̂1piict + α̂2pi
2
ict
+ α̂3p̂(y1ict, y2ict) + α̂4p̂(y1ict, y2ict)
2 + α̂5piict · p̂(y1ict, y2ict)
] (A.5)
where the term inside the brackets on the righthand side is evaluated for each individual,
and the expectation over these values is evaluated by local polynomial regression over 50
centiles of the marriage penalty pi. Since ̂E(Im(pi)) is estimated using generated regressors
and parameters, I recover standard errors by bootstrapping the entire process described
above 1000 times over the sample of heterosexual households observed between 2002 and
2004. Equation A.5 estimates the causal effects of marriage penalties on marital choice.
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I do this by penalty type (both instantaneous and endogenous) and by the number of
children present in the household (none, one, or greater than one).
The regression output from equation A.3 is given in table A.2. These results are used
to predict the righthand side of equation A.5. The estimates of the average potential
outcome ̂E(Im(pi)) are plotted in figure 3.
A.3 Bias of Instantaneous Marriage Penalty
To state the bias of the instantaneous method, I make two assumptions. First, workers do
not opt into or out of the labor market due to the marital tax schedule changes. Second,
I assume that an individual’s (household’s) income tax deduction is independent of their
level of income, at least on the margin of changes being considered. Wages are also treated
as fixed here. Let e ∈ {1, 2} denote the primary and secondary earner, respectively, and
q ∈ {m, s} denote martial status (married, single). The instantaneous method assumes
that within each household, each individual’s hours are fixed at the observed level heq = h
e.
Taking wages we and non-labor income ne as given, write instantaneous gross income in
martial state q as yeq = w
ehe + ne. Given the average tax rate τ eq , we can calculate the
instantaneous marriage penalty
I = [τ 1my
1
m + τ
2
my
2
m]− [τ 1s y1s + τ 2s y2s ] . (A.6)
When labor supply choice is allowed to be a function of the marginal tax rate, I write
expected hours and income given taxes as ĥeq and ŷ
e
q = w
eĥeq + n
e. Acknowledging that
the average tax rate is in turn dependent on this endogenous hours choice, τ̂ eq , we can
write the endogenous marriage penalty as
E = [τ̂ 1mŷ
1
m + τ̂
2
mŷ
2
m]− [τ̂ 1s ŷ1s + τ̂ 2s ŷ2s ] . (A.7)
The bias of the instantaneous method of measurement is then
I − E =
[
(τ 1my
1
m − τ̂ 1mŷ1m)− (τ 1s y1s − τ̂ 1s ŷ1s)
]
+
[
(τ 2my
2
m − τ̂ 2mŷ2m)− (τ 2s y2s − τ̂ 2s ŷ2s)
]
(A.8)
One particularly useful way of stating this bias arises by first pulling non-work income
out of yeq , and adding and subtracting, for an individual of observed martial status q (and
−q representing the other marital status) the terms weheqτ e−q, weĥeq τ̂ e−q, weye−q(τ̂ em − τ̂ es ),
and weτ eq (ĥ
e
m − ĥes). The result is that we can state the instantaneous bias as
I − E =
∑
e=1,2
we
[
heq
(
(τ em − τ es )− (τ̂ em − τ̂ es )
)
+ (heq − ĥeq)(τ̂ em − τˆ es )
+ τ e−q
(
(hem − hes)− (ĥem − ĥes)
)
+ (τ e−q − τ̂ e−q)(ĥem − ĥes)
]
+ nem(τ
e
m − τ̂ em)− nes(τ es − τ̂ es )
(A.9)
which is equation 3 given in the text.
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Men Women Men Women
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
Panel a: mean statistics
Black 0.078 0.07 0.143 0.11 0.045 0.054 0.066 0.064
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 40.3 38.5 34.3 32.6 39.1 37.9 38.3 37.6
(0.057) (0.056) (0.207) (0.200) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) (0.132)
Years of education 13.7 13.7 12.6 12.8 15.0 14.3 15.0 14.5
(0.021) (0.019) (0.056) (0.055) (0.048) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Number of own biological 1.49 1.51 0.32 0.53 0.10 0.06 0.22 0.17
      children present (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009)
Particpate in labor force 0.963 0.717 0.953 0.793 0.973 0.845 0.966 0.84
      (at survey date) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Annual hours worked, if >0 2,233 1,698 2,062 1,859 2,229 1,995 2,151 1,928
(4.5) (5.5) (16.7) (15.9) (9.6) (10.6) (8.5) (9.2)
HH has non-labor income
Panel b: median statistics
Gross wage if hours > 0 19.87 14.24 13.89 12.29 24.21 16.34 20.54 14.92
(0.16) (0.13) (0.39) (0.29) (0.44) (0.35) (0.34) (0.24)
Gross labor income if hours > 0 43,883 24,306 28,046 23,232 53,428 32,692 44,000 28,743
(348) (213) (600) (534) (917) (497) (698) (423)
HH labor income
HH non-labor income, if any
N 37649 37649 3263 3263 7082 7082 7058 7058
Note: Individual statistics are weighted by Census person weights, household characteristics by household weights.  Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  All financial variables are stated in terms of 2004 dollars. 
(0.011)(0.003)
0.4530.3370.366
(84)
2,804
(274) (147)(264)
3,000 3,076
50,12666,792
(978)
2,194
(412) (910) (1247)
Table 1: Census 2000-2007 summary statistics for individuals in co-resident households, by sexual orientation
Heterosexual
Married Unmarried Men Women
Homosexual
(0.007)
70,31983,847
(0.007)
0.456
Hetero 
married
Hetero 
partner Gay men
Lesbian 
women
Hetero 
married
Hetero 
partner Gay men
Lesbian 
women
Hetero 
married
Hetero 
partner Gay men
Lesbian 
women
actual household federal income taxes
2000-2003 20,624 14,342 28,748 21,781 18,751 7,779 13,896 12,476 16,325 5,978 8,056 11,925
(424) (684) (710) (644) (476) (680) (3447) (882) (324) (654) (2267) (1717)
2004-2007 18,638 14,701 26,738 19,545 16,858 6,701 18,011 15,632 15,420 4,417 15,199 13,455
(370) (641) (489) (370) (316) (535) (2260) (944) (252) (435) (2136) (1003)
change after JGTRRA -1,986 359 -2,010 -2,236 -1,894 -1,077 4,116 3,157 -905 -1,561 7,143 1,531
(610) (1064) (967) (842) (623) (1001) (4523) (1520) (449) (926) (3549) (2223)
average marriage penalty payment
2000-2003 183 469 1098 817 1692 735 1317 1393 1230 623 871 1604
(35) (46) (62) (56) (54) (145) (434) (127) (39) (197) (300) (233)
2004-2007 -613 -220 156 -176 757 234 621 439 259 -467 731 302
(32) (45) (45) (32) (40) (95) (231) (124) (31) (161) (274) (195)
change after JGTRRA -796 -689 -942 -993 -935 -501 -696 -954 -971 -1,090 -140 -1,301
(48) (64) (76) (65) (54) (158) (482) (173) (43) (247) (505) (302)
N 9855 1773 6541 5388 9272 747 293 956 18524 737 234 690
Note : all tax data is calculated through TAXSIM on Census data, using the variables described in footnote 5 of the text.  Bold numbers indicate 
that the change in the variable after the 2003 JGTRRA (whose effects first appear in the 2004 ACS) is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Financial variables are stated in terms of 2004 dollars.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.
No children One child More than one child
Table 2: Household tax liability and marriage penalty
Men Women Men Women
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
Individual marginal tax rate (Federal income tax+ individual portion of FICA)
2000-2003 0.255 0.283 0.275 0.216 0.312 0.246 0.304 0.239
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
2004-2007 0.23 0.257 0.259 0.199 0.297 0.235 0.283 0.22
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
change after JGTRRA -0.025 -0.026 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.011 -0.021 -0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
"Rate marriage penalty"
2000-2003 -0.036 0.099 -0.056 0.043 -0.046 0.064 -0.052 0.058
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
2004-2007 -0.046 0.084 -0.059 0.034 -0.053 0.045 -0.058 0.047
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
change after JGTRRA -0.010 -0.015 -0.003 -0.009 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006 -0.011
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
N 37651 37651 3264 3264 7082 7082 7058 7058
Note : all tax data is calculated through TAXSIM on Census data, using the variables described in footnote 5 of the text.  Bold numbers  
indicate that the change in the variable after the 2003 JGTRRA (whose effects first appear in the 2004 ACS) is statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  Financial variables are stated in terms of 2004 dollars.  The "rate marriage penalty" is the marginal tax rate if married 
minus the marginal rate if single.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 3: Marginal income tax rates, marriage, and the Bush tax reforms
Heterosexual Homosexual
Married Unmarried Men Women
Hetero 
married 
men
Hetero 
parter 
men
Gay 
men
Lesbian 
women
Hetero 
married 
women
Hetero 
partner 
women
Gay 
men
Lesbian 
women
Panel A: grouping instrument results
Log own marginal wage 53.28 -339.98 -191.61 -130.79 224.47 -231.04 -167.50 -461.74
(69.16) (132.06) (114.84) (103.44) (68.80) (106.93) (163.14) (114.01)
Log partner marginal wage 120.59 395.33 410.26 278.14 -189.74 316.07 515.90 532.14
(66.30) (122.02) (141.41) (114.50) (64.15) (114.35) (131.74) (106.47)
HH non-work income 1.11 0.14 -1.21 -5.09 3.88 -3.13 -2.97 -12.04
       (in thousands) (2.05) (4.29) (1.64) (2.33) (3.87) (3.85) (1.72) (2.48)
I(no children) -11.27 -199.85 -98.34 14.46 139.68 -45.00 -94.82 135.86
(39.36) (132.85) (214.84) (94.61) (44.07) (126.41) (207.98) (95.34)
Number of children in HH 13.28 -95.64 -59.90 -22.95 -46.87 -9.94 -6.79 85.68
(15.36) (59.29) (74.83) (54.01) (19.48) (66.27) (110.15) (51.67)
Panel B: grouping + re-weighting results
Log own marginal wage 114.547 -287.12 -29.209 -70.653 469.421 -537.56 -352.31 -591.5
(62.93) (125.81) (115.13) (104.12) (100.81) (112.15) (173.11) (110.43)
Log partner marginal wage 102.067 321.441 224.476 255.602 -276.2 419.375 769.024 742.103
(63.58) (111.44) (128.56) (109.85) (86.97) (117.65) (139.79) (119.25)
HH non-work income 0.3 0.861 -1.996 -3.826 4.644 -3.711 -3.573 -12.38
       (in thousands) (1.97) (3.95) (1.97) (2.56) (3.80) (4.58) (2.01) (2.82)
I(no children) -13.05 -205.33 -77.192 -18.193 193.424 32.571 -189.02 273.379
(42.61) (136.58) (236.30) (132.92) (62.16) (140.02) (226.01) (161.64)
Number of children in HH 16.968 -100.81 -43.713 -69.804 -54.02 -16.455 -7.972 148.287
(16.85) (59.24) (82.38) (89.69) (25.58) (73.41) (106.07) (86.36)
Panel C: grouping + wage imputation results
Log own marginal wage 108.599 -186.05 12.75 116.34 586.17 -420.55 -403.82 -837.14
(52.04) (109.60) (101.98) (76.90) (86.83) (147.75) (175.62) (91.37)
Log partner marginal wage 85.882 251.885 104.882 27.328 -329 536.734 841.083 884.275
(61.12) (114.54) (134.56) (82.76) (71.61) (168.34) (126.53) (98.39)
HH non-work income -0.139 -5.244 -2.992 -5.953 -0.799 -22.411 -11.278 -17.137
       (in thousands) (1.60) (4.97) (2.19) (2.37) (4.41) (10.24) (3.00) (3.31)
I(no children) -17.145 -196.89 473.948 31.822 228.235 353.31 140.174 232.037
(35.47) (126.03) (223.13) (98.23) (54.24) (179.16) (237.01) (158.31)
Number of children in HH 14.573 -139.52 214.306 -40.82 -95.331 11.833 -82.215 89.32
(13.05) (53.65) (104.73) (61.29) (22.01) (96.66) (115.75) (84.32)
Note :  Dependent variable is annual hours of work.  All regressions use own- and parter-group indicators 
as instruments for own- and partmer-wages.  Each regression also includes indicator variables controlling 
for race, hispanic ethnicity, year, and census region, using data from year 2003 and 2004.  The definition 
of grouping instuments, re-weighting procedure (for panel b) and wage imputation methodology (for panel
c) are all described in Appendix A.1. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Primary earners Secondary earners
Table 4: Labor supply function by coresidency type and primary/secondary earner status 
Men Women
HH 
Total Men Women
HH 
Total
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
HH 
Total
Prime 
earner
Second 
earner
HH 
Total
(1)  Tax rate bias: -60 -286 -346 -14 -506 -520 6 -95 -89 -71 -179 -250
(11) (14) (17) (40) (66) (71) (12) (23) (26) (16) (22) (27)
(2)  Model bias: 101 -655 -554 -2 -269 -271 26 -585 -559 31 -249 -218
(8) (28) (29) (31) (94) (96) (18) (69) (72) (18) (51) (57)
(3)  Hours bias 4 69 73 46 -58 -12 10 -306 -296 -35 -345 -380
(1) (2) (2) (4) (6) (3) (1) (9) (7) (1) (9) (9)
(4)  Counterfactual bias 2 8 10 -1 3 2 1 -14 -13 0 -10 -10
(0) (1) (1) (2) (4) (3) (0) (3) (3) (0) (3) (3)
(5)  Non-work income bias -5 -10 -15 13 -39 -26 -1 -67 -68 1 -39 -38
(2) (3) (4) (8) (18) (15) (4) (14) (13) (4) (8) (8)
Total bias: (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) 42 -874 -832 42 -869 -827 42 -1067 -1025 -74 -822 -896
(12) (26) (28) (50) (82) (85) (19) (72) (72) (21) (58) (58)
N
Note :  Decomposition of instantaneous marriage penalty minus endogenous marriage penalty in post-JGTRRA years (2004-2007), as derived in 
appendix A.3.   Subscript q indicates the actual marital status of the household, -q indicates the other marital status.
Table 5: Bias in instantaneous marriage penalty calculation
22,198 1,962 4,506 4,546
Married Unmarried Men Women
Heterosexual Homosexual
)ττ(*)h-(h*w smqq
 −
( ))ττ( -)τ(τ*h*w smsmq
 −−
))hh(-)h((h*τ*w smsmq-
 −−
 n*)ττ( n*)τ(τ sssmmm
 −−−
)h-hˆ(*)τ(τ*w smq-q-
−
Instantaneou
s penalty
Endogenous 
penalty
Endogenous, 
de-biased 
116 237 214
(7) (13) (11)
231 474 428
(10) (17) (15)
205 416 372
(10) (17) (14)
179 326 310
(9) (15) (13)
104 202 192
(7) (12) (10)
16 126 78
(5) (7) (7)
31 252 156
(7) (11) (10)
36 223 138
(7) (10) (9)
13 180 131
(7) (9) (9)
7 109 78
(5) (7) (7)
Note : units are millions of 2004 dollars.  Stadard errors are given in parenthesis, generated by taking random
draws from U[0,1] to determine who marries, summing the change in annual tax payment, and bootstrapping 1000
repetitions over this measure.  The de-biased measure is equal to the endogenous penalty, less the effects of the 
modeling and counterfactual biases described in table 5.
p = f(demograhpics)
p = heterosexual conditional 
marriage expectation
p = mean-50 conditional 
marriage expectation
p = 0.5
p = 1
p = f(demograhpics)
p = heterosexual conditional 
marriage expectation
p = mean-50 conditional 
marriage expectation
Table 6: changes in federal income tax revenue after same-sex marriage legalization
Pre-JGTRRA (2000 - 2002)
Post-JGTRRA (2005 - 2007)
p = 0.5
p = 1
Note : Black outlined bars indicate the distribution before implementation of the JGTRRA, grey bars the 
distribution after.  The distributions in this figure have been truncated for illustrative purposes - penalty
data ranges from -$10,569 to $25,898.
Figure 1:  Mean marriage penalty across time by coresidency type 
Figure 2:  Distribution of marriage penalties, before and after tax reform 
Figure 3: Average potential marriage outcome, given marriage penalty
Note : Plots are of average potential marriage outcome as a function of marriage penalty, for heterosexual households with zero, one, or multiple children.
The black solid line indicates the treatment effect as measured by the instantaneous marriage penalty, and the grey solid line measures the treatment effect
 as measured by the endogenous marriage penalty.  The dashed grey lines represent a 95% confidence interval (CI) on the estimates using the endogenous penalty
(I have suppressed the CI for the instantaneous method for graphical clarity).  The methodology for generating average treatment outcomes follows Hirano and 
Imbens (2004), and is described in detail in appendix A.2.
Childless households One-child households 
Multiple-child households 
               Table A.1: pre-JGTRRA determinants of expected marriage penalty
Instantaneous 
penalty
Endogenous 
penalty
Labor income of high earner /1,000 29.850 10.138
(2.234) (2.702)
(Labor income of high earner) 2 /1,000,000 0.391 -0.129
(0.018) (0.019)
(High labor income - low labor income) /1,000 -65.974 -21.792
(1.536) (2.018)
(High labor income - low labor income) 2 /1,000,000 -0.332 0.157
(0.016) (0.018)
Household investment income 0.048 0.033
(0.006) (0.003)
HH retirement income 0.042 0.051
(0.006) (0.006)
HH other income 0.039 0.026
(0.005) (0.006)
HH rent payment -0.172 0.279
(0.037) (0.056)
HH roperty tax payment -0.054 0.024
(0.007) (0.011)
Constant -344.360 184.276
(47.630) (61.511)
N 8738 8738
R2 0.7557 0.1656
Note : Dependent variable is marriage penalty.  Estimate is based on heterosexual households in 2002
and 2003, over the common supposert of penalties between married and unmarried households.
Estimate also includes indicator variables for every observed number  of children. Standard errors
are in parenthesis.
No 
children One child
More than 
one child
No 
children One child
More than 
one child
Marriage penalty/1000 -0.135 -0.077 -0.007 -0.132 0.071 -0.094
(0.089) (0.103) (0.055) (0.034) (0.073) (0.072)
(Marriage penalty) 2/1,000,000 0.034 -0.341 -0.237 -0.057 -0.067 -0.036
(0.065) (0.041) (0.042) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Expected penalty/1000 0.030 -0.398 -0.517 -0.311 -0.372 -0.832
(0.079) (0.198) (0.105) (0.117) (0.236) (0.569)
(Expected penalty) 2/1,000,000 -0.013 -0.263 -0.168 0.035 -0.083 -0.147
(0.036) (0.070) (0.036) (0.063) (0.102) (0.226)
Actual penalty * expected penalty -0.029 0.779 0.519 0.128 0.039 0.127
(0.098) (0.116) (0.085) (0.089) (0.073) (0.060)
Constant 1.114 1.652 2.168 1.054 1.748 2.754
(0.047) (0.155) (0.102) (0.053) (0.169) (0.350)
N 3,036 2,218 4,408 3,036 2,218 4,408
Note : probit estimate of marriagie likelihood, according to appendix equation A.5.   Estimate is based on 
heterosexual households in 2003 and 2004 over the common supposert of penalties between married and 
unmarried households.  Expected marriage penalty is calculated based on the results of table A.1.
Unadjusted standard errors are in parenthesis.
Instantaneous penalty Endogenous penalty
        Table A.2: conditional marriage probability given treatment and expected treatment
